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The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks
Law
-- Jane C. Ginsburg*
Introduction
If you inquired among the general public, “What does US copyright
law protect?” many people might start by grumbling that it overprotects
piggish record companies. Calming slightly, they might next reply that
copyright protects authors’ rights, and that among those is the right to be
recognized as the author of the work. Indeed, few interests seem as
fundamentally intuitive as that authorship credit sho uld be given where
credit is due. 1 For example, in prelapsarian, pre-Napster days, the act of
copyright infringement in which a youthful individual might most likely
engage was probably plagiarism: there, lifting another author’s text may
have been unlawful, but at least as morally (and pedagogically)
reprehensible was passing it off as the lifter’s. 2 Giving credit where it is
due, moreover, is instinctively appropriate because it furthers the interests
both of authors and of their public. For the pub lic, the author’s name,
once known, alerts readers/viewers/listeners to particular characteristics or
qualities to expect in the work. 3 For authors, name recognition enhances
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1
See, e.g., Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto (Jan. 22, 2003) available at
http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/dcm.html (rejecting most of copyright but
upholding the protection of the integrity of creative works); Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism,
Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 Hastings L.J. 168, 175 (2002)
(identifying a social “attribution norm,” and stating that the relevant community views
“attribution as being, or as akin to being, a moral obligation, rather like showing respect
to one’s elders.”)
2
See, e.g. plagiarism policy of Columbia College, Columbia University, available at
http://www.college.columbia.edu/bulletin/universitypolicies.php. “Every year there are
instances in which students attempt to submit the work of other people as their own.
Because intellectual integrity is the hallmark of educational institutions, academic
dishonesty is one of the most serious offenses that a student can commit at Columbia. It
is punishable by suspension or dismissal from the College.”
3
This consideration resembles the rationale for trademark protection. Cf. J. Thomas
McCarthy, M CCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §3:10 (“Trademark
signifies that all goods sold under it are of equal quality,” they thus symbolize a
consistency of consumer experience with the goods or services).

sales (at least when the work that previously bore the author’s name has
been well-received). As one Federal Court judge aptly put it:
Reputation is critical to a person who follows a vocation dependent
on commissions from a variety of clients. Success breeds success,
but only if the first success is known to potential clients. To deprive
a person of credit to which he was justly entitled is to do him a great
wrong. Not only does he lose the general benefit of being associated
with a successful production; he loses the chance of using that work
to sell his abilities. 4
Most national copyright laws guarantee the right of attribution (or
“paternity”); 5 the leading international copyright treaty, the Berne
Convention, requires that Member States protect other Members’ authors’
“right to claim authorship.”6 Yet, perhaps to the surprise of many, no such
right exists in US copyright law nor in other US laws. 7 (The Federal
Court judge just quoted sits on the Australian Federal Court, not on any
U.S. bench.) For a time, it seemed as if the Lanham Federal Trademarks
Act provided partial coverage: by making false and confusing designations
of origin actionable, the Act -- many thought -- afforded authors relief
against misattributions of authorship. 8 Even so, the trademarks law would
4

Prior v. Sheldon, 48 IPR 301 (Fed. Ct. Aus. 2000).
See, e.g., Article L.121-1 of France’s Intellectual Property Code (Law No. 92-597
1992), which recognizes an author’s “right to respect for his name [and] his status as an
author” and is intended to enable the author to be identified as the author of the work on
copies or whenever communicated to the public. In Spain, the rights of “personal
character” under the 1987 Copyright Act include the author’s “right to obtain recognition
of his authorship of the work.” Article 14(3).
6
Berne Conv. Art. 6bis.
7
Except for the very narrowly-defined right set out in the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17
U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A), discussed infra.
8
See H.R. Rep. No. 100-609 at 37 (stressing that the Director General of WIPO endorsed
the view that U.S. law already met the art. 6bis standard). The Final Report of the Ad
Hoc Working Group on US Adherence to the Berne Convention, a group formed at State
Department behest whose report was submitted to Congress, also concluded that US law
afforded “substantial protection for the real equivalent of [the] moral rights [of attribution
and integrity],” particularly by recourse to the Lanham Act, see Final Report at 35, 39-42,
reprinted at 10 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 513, 547, 551-54 (1986).
In contrast, U.S. patent law requires that the true and original inventor or inventors be
named in the application for a patent, see §§ 116, 117; 37 C.F.R. § 1.45-48.. § 102(f) of
the Patent Act expressly states that a person will lose patent rights if “he did not himself
invent the subject matter sought to be patented,” and § 101 provides that only “whoever
invents or discovers ... may obtain a patent thereof.” See e.g. University of Colorado
Foundation Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 105 F. Supp.2d 1164, 1175, (D. Colo. 2000)
(“As patents reward inventors for disclosing beneficial technology to the public, a person
cannot reap the reward of exclusive rights to an invention without being the true
inventor.”)
For a recent, comprehensive review of US attribution right caselaw, see Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire
Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 W ASH. L. RE V. 985 (2002).
5
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only have reprimanded giving credit to one to whom credit was not due; it
would not have afforded an affirmative right to claim authorship. In other
words, giving incorrect credit may have been actionable; giving no credit
was not. 9
In any event, last June, the US Supreme Court interpreted the
Lanham Act to deny false attribution claims as to the origin of a
“communicative product.” The Court thus drastically limited invocation of
the trademarks law to enforce authors’ interests in being recognized as the
creators of their works. In the wake of Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox,10
what recourse do authors have in the US to claim authorship? I will first
address the Dastar decision, to discern if any residue of attribution rights
remains under the Lanham Act. Next, I will consider the extent to which
the Copyright Act does, or might, afford attribution rights. That inquiry
leads to the (despondent) answer that in the U.S. neither the copyright nor
the trademarks laws establish a right of attribution generally applicable to
all creators of all types of works of authorship. After examining other
common law countries’ recent enactments protecting attribution rights, I
will propose an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to add a federal
right of attribution of authorship.
I.

(Dis)Claiming Authorship Under the Federal Trademarks Law

In what some might see as an act of contrition for having upheld
copyright term extension in Eldred v. Ashcroft,11 the Supreme Court made
clear, in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox , that a work’s entry into the
public domain precludes resort to another federal intellectual property
statute, the Lanham Trademarks Act, to achieve a de facto prolongation of
exclusive copyright- like rights. In so doing, however, the Court appears to
have stricken the Lanham Act from the roll of laws authors might invoke
in support of attribution rights. The facts of the case had nothing to do
with authors, were very unappealing, and were as follows. In 1949,
Twentieth Century Fox produced a multi-part television series, “Crusade
in Europe,” based on then-General Eisenhower’s campaign memoirs. In
1977, after Fox failed to renew the copyright registration, the work went
into the public domain. In 1995, Dastar released a set of videos,
“Campaigns in Europe,” substantially copied from “Crusade.” Dastar
9

See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) (claim against architect who
had substituted his name for another’s on architectural plans). Smith v. Montoro, 648
F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim against film company who substituted one actor’s name
for another in the film credits); Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th
Cir. 1988) (claim by co-authors against songwriter who published music under only his
name). See generally, JANE C. GISBURG, JESSICA LITMAN, AND MARY L. KEVLIN,
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (3d ed. 2001), 618-642.
10
--- US ---, 123 S.Ct. 2041 (2003).
11
537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court granted cert in Dastar on January 15, 2003, five days
before announcing its decision in Eldred. See 537 U.S. 1099 (2003).
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listed itself as the producer of “Campaigns,” without reference to
“Crusade” or Fox. Fox sued, claiming that Dastar’s release of the videos
under its own name constituted “reverse passing off” in violation of the
Lanham Federal Trademarks Act, section 43(a). Substituting Dastar’s
name for Fox’s constituted a “false designation of origin,” because Fox,
the original producer, was the originator of the “Crusade” television series
that “Campaigns” “bodily appropriated,” Fox contended. The Dis trict
Court agreed, and awarded Fox double Dastar’s profits, thus granting Fox
perhaps a higher damages award than it would have received for copyright
infringement (had Fox’s copyright still been in force). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court reversed, 8-0
(Justice Breyer recused).
The unanimous opinion construed the statute’s prohibition on
“us[ing] in commerce” (selling) any “false designation of origin . . . which
is likely to . . . cause mistake, or to deceive as to the . . . origin . . . of his
or her goods . . . by another person.”12 The Court held that “origin” in the
sense of the Lanham Act does not mean the original creator of a work of
authorship from which copies are made, but rather the source of the
particular copies (goods) that are being distributed. 13 Thus, a reverse
passing off claim “would undoubtedly be sustained if [the defendant] had
bought some of [the] Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them as
its own.”14 But the Court rejected the contention that a different concept
of “origin” should apply to a “communicative product” – a work of
authorship. Arguably, the Court’s refusal to accord authors the status of
“originators” of communicative works was limited to works whose
copyrights had expired, rather than extending to all communicative works,
whatever their copyright status. The Court referred some ten times to the
copyright-expired status of Fox’s television series. The Court’s doubts
about the validity of an interpretation of “origin” to mean “author” seem
closely entwined with its concern to maintain the public domain. For
example, the Court objected: “Reading ‘origin’ in [the trademarks act] to
require attribution of uncopyrighted materials would pose serious practical
problems. Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word ‘origin’
has no discernable limits.”15
On the other hand, it is not clear why, under the concept of
“origin” the Court attributed to the trademarks act, authors would qualify
as originators of copyright-protected works. If, as the Court stated, “the
phrase [origin of goods] refers to the producer of the tangible goods that
are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or

12

See 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1), section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
123 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-8 (2003).
14
Id. at 2046.
15
Id. at 2049.
13
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communication embodied in those goods,” 16 what enables the phrase
nonetheless to refer to the author of a still-copyrighted work? Whether or
not the work is under copyright, its author remains the same person. The
distinction between authors as originators of copyrighted works and non
originators of the same works when the works fall out of copyright may
seem strained. Dastar therefore prompts the concern -- reinforced by
lower court decisions interpreting Dastar -- that the Supreme Court may
have disqualified authors from pleading the trademark act’s prohibition on
false designation of origin to support a claim to attribution of authorship
status. 17
It is, accordingly, important to assess the likely impact of the
Dastar decision on the protection of attribution rights in still-copyrighted
works. (The Berne Convention does not require protection of moral rights
in works whose copyrights have expired. 18 ) In addition, one should
consider whether other portions of the trademarks act may be successfully
invoked to vindicate interests that formerly might have been redressed by
claims against “false designation of origin.”
To preserve authors’ claims under the Lanham Act, one might
stress the facts of the Dastar case. Whatever the broader implications of
the Court’s language, the case itself concerned a copyright-expired work.
In a common law system, a decision’s authority is bound to what the Court
actually decided. As a result, neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts
would be precluded from fresh consideration of the application of the
Lanham Act’s protection of “designation of origin” in the context of an
author who asserts that another person was improperly credited as the
author of her still- copyrighted work. Thus, even though the Court’s
articulation of its reading of “origin” may not readily yield a distinction
between the origin of works still under and no longer under copyright, the
facts of the case would support, albeit not compel, that distinction. I
acknowledge, however, that lower courts have so far declined to limit
Dastar’s reach to copyright-expired works. 19
Despite this so far unflinching application of Dastar to stillcopyrighted works, one should recognize that the rationale behind the
Supreme Court’s rejection of attribution rights in copyright-expired works
16

Id. at 2049.
Federal district court decisions subsequent to Dastar have declined to limit that
decision’s impact to copyright-expired works. See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings,
281 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Carroll v. Kahn, 68 USPQ2d 1357
(N.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Bretford Mfg. Inc. v. Smith System Manufacturing Co, 286
F.Supp.2d 969, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Dastar held not limited to “communicative
products,” and held to bar reverse passing off claim regarding origin of component of a
table; the “goods” are the table, not its various components).
18
See Berne Conv. Art. 6bis(2).
19
See cases cited, supra note 16.
17
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does not extend to copyright-protected works. The Court placed great
emphasis on the unconstrained ability of the public to copy and distribute
public domain works. Requiring accurate attribution of creative origin,
according to the Court, improperly impedes the public’s entitlement.
Where, by contrast, the work is still subject to the author’s exclusive right
to make the work available in copies or by transmission, then requirements
as to how the copies or transmissions are labeled take nothing from the
public.
Even where the work is in the public domain, however, the Court
might have recognized that an obligation correctly to credit the author of a
copyright-expired work addresses a different concern, one at trademark
law’s core – accuracy in market information. Advancing this goal need
not impede the free use of the work’s content. It is not apparent how the
public interest in access to public domain works is furthered by permitting
a purveyor to sell those works under another author’s name. For example,
an anonymous seventeenth-century Elizabethan or Jacobean drama is
certainly in the public domain and anyone may copy and sell it. But what
is the public interest in allowing the seller to pass the work off as
Shakespeare’s? Yet, if putting Shakespeare’s name on the cover is not a
“false designation of origin” then there may be no violation of that section
of the Lanham Act. 20 In its zeal to preserve copyright’s public domain,
the Court has arguably misunderstood the task of trademarks law.
In fairness to the Court, however, the remedy entered by the
district court also failed to respect the different goals these two forms of
intellectual property serve. By awarding Fox twice Dastar’s profits, the
district court entered a remedy akin to, if not in fact more generous than,
the relief Fox would have received in a copyright infringement action.
This does make the trademark claim seem like “a species of mutant
copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use,”
expired copyrights.’” But the trademarks act in fact gives courts
considerable discretion in fashioning remedies;21 the district court could
have (and the Supreme Court perhaps should have) recognized the claim,
but limited relief to accurate labeling of the copies of the videos.
20

Passing off the anonymous work as Shakespeare’s may, however, be a false statement
of fact regarding the work’s qualities or characteristics, in violation of sec. 43(a)(1)(B),
see discussion infra.
21
See 15 U.S.C. sec. 1117(a), Lanham Act sec. 35(a) (“If the court shall find that the
amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court shall
in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just.”)
In addition, the Court entered the remedy without inquiring into whether the
public was likely to be confused regarding the origin of the television series; rather it
appears to have assumed confusion would result from the “bodily appropriation” (very
substantial copying) of the Fox series. Because trademarks law protects the public from
market confusion, while copyright protects against copying regardless of confusion,
short-circuiting the inquiry into confusion may also risk turning trademark claims into a
back-up claim for expired copyrights, which was of course the Court’s concern.
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Significantly, examples from copyright law illustrate the
distinction between freedom to copy and obligation not to mislabel as to
the goods’ origin in a way that is likely to cause consumer confusion.
Thus, copying of protected material that might otherwise have qualified as
an educational fair use may be deemed “unfair” if the copier intentionally
removes reference to the copied work’s author and passes it off as his
own. 22 The Berne Convention permits free copying for purposes of
teaching and news reporting, but requires that the source be credited.23
The distinction that undergirds these examples should be borne in mind
lest one be tempted to extend to copyrighted works Dastar’s solicitude for
untrammeled, uncredited, free copying from public domain works.
The facts of Dastar point to an additional distinction that may help
preserve some authors’ attribution interests. Fox was the successor in title
to Time, Inc., the principal creator of the television series “Crusade in
Europe.” Thus Fox’s own creative contribution was more formal than real.
Moreover, even if Fox were the original producer, it did not originate most
of the series’ content. As the Dastar Court pointed out, most of the series’
film footage was taken by armed services personnel and news reporters.
Fox (via Time) may have overseen the assembly of the series’ pregenerated components, but even if Fox was the “originator” of the whole,
it was not the “originator” of the parts. Given the many- layered
composition of the series, “If anyone has a claim to being the original
creator of the material used in both the Crusade television series and the
Campaigns videotapes, it would be those groups, rather than Fox. We do
not think the Lanham Act requires this search for the source of the Nile
and all its tributaries.” 24 This objection to recognizing authors as
“originators” of copyrighted works does not apply to works whose
creation lacks the near-archaeological complexity attributed to “Crusade,”
much less to works of music, drama, photography and literature, many of
which are single-authored. 25
Finally, the Dastar Court left open two avenues within the
trademarks act to vindicate creators’ rights. First, the Court recognized
reverse passing off claims when the defendant has “merely repackaged as
his own” goods which the defe ndant has not otherwise altered. Second, it
preserved claims under a related section of the trademarks act. The Court
stated:
22

See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989). See also Rogers v. Koons,
960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (removal of plaintiff photographer’s copyright notice part of
a pattern of behavior disqualifying from fair use exception defendant’s unauthorized
sculpture based on photograph).
23
Berne Conv. Arts. 10(3), 10bis(1).
24
Dastar, 123 S.Ct. at 2049.
25
Part III of this lecture will consider attribution rights in connection with multipleauthored works, see infra.

7

If, moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied the
Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give purchasers
the impression that the video was quite different from that series,
then one or more of the respondents might have a cause of action -not for reverse passing off under the “confusion . . . as to the origin”
provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but for misrepresentation under the
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities” provision of
§ 43(a)(1)(B). 26 For merely saying it is the producer of the video,
however, no Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar. 27
Let us therefore consider whether authors might still vindicate
attribution rights by bringing claims against reverse passing off through
“mere repackaging.” We will also assess whether authors would have
valid claims against misrepresentations of the nature, characteristics or
qualities of a work of authorship. With respect to what a “mere
repackaging” reverse passing off claim would cover, it is important to
recognize that, notwithstanding Dastar’s emphasis on free copying from
the public domain, not every exploitation that the copyright law might
permit will escape Lanham Act condemnation. For example, the
copyright law “first sale doctrine” entitles purchasers of tangible copies of
a work of authorship to resell, rent or lend those copies, without the
copyright owner’s authorization. But, even under Dastar, that does not
mean that the Lanham Act will allow me to purchase copies of the latest
Brad Meltzer or John Grisham legal thrillers, and resell them under my
own name. In fact, that would seem to be exactly the situation posited in
the Court’s caveat that a reverse passing off claim “would undoubtedly be
sustained if [the defendant] had bought some of [the] Crusade videotapes
and merely repackaged them as its own.”
Nor, despite the Court’s linkage of “origin” with physical copies,
should the “mere repackaging” claim be limited to communication of
physical copies originally manufactured by the trademarks claimant. For
one thing, it would be extraordinarily formalistic were the “mere
repackaging” claim confined to physical copies that Dastar recycles, and
thus exclude exact copies that Dastar reproduces. The “goods” at issue
should be understood to be any physical reproductions, not only the ones
made by the claimant. Otherwise, the statute would reach the soda
company that purchased old Coca Cola bottles (whose vintage design is
undoubtedly, as a matter of copyright or design patent law, in the public
domain) and refilled them with a substitute cola, but not the soda company
26

15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(2), Lanham Act Sec. 43(a)(2), which prohibits any “false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which -- . . .
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or]
qualities . . . of his or her or another person’s goods . . .”
27
Dastar, 123 S.Ct. at 2049.
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who makes new bottles in the shape of the Coca Cola bottle, and fills them
with the substitute. 28
One might further contend that “mere repackaging” should not be
limited to physical copies of any kind. If Dastar had broadcast the
“Crusades” series in its entirety, changing only the name of the producer,
then the public’s receipt of the repackage in ephemeral rather than tangible
form would seem to be a distinction without a difference. The designation
is equally false whether the public views the series as a broadcast or on
home video. Moreover, the pertinent section of the Lanha m Act covers
any “false designation of origin” “in connection with any goods or
services.” 29 While copies are “goods,” transmissions are generally
considered “services.” 30 A claim of false designation of origin with
respect to services cannot be analyzed by reference to the producer of
physical copies, because there are none. 31 For broadcasts and other
transmissions, the “origin” would mean the originator of the content
transmitted, that is the producers and creator(s) of the programming. In
this context “origin” is not properly attributed to the originator of the
transmission -- the transmitting entity, because the transmitting entity is
generally not the owner of or symbolized by the service mark for the
content transmitted. For example, the classic television series I Love Lucy
may be communicated over many different broadcast and cable stations;
the series’ name, its service mark, designates the series as created and
performed in by Lucille Ball and collaborators; it does not mean the series
as transmitted by which ever stations are broadcasting or otherwise
communicating it. This should be true regardless of whether or not the
series is still under copyright.
Exploitations by non-creator copyright owners present another
type of copyright-permitted activity that might run afoul of the Lanham
Act’s prohibition on false designations of origin via “mere repackaging.”
The Court rather blithely assumed that attribution of copyrighted works
was a non-problem because the author who grants rights in the work will
be sure to insist that her licensee gives her appropriate name credit. (Note
28

Cf. Dastar, 123 S.Ct. at 2047 (the Lanham Act “forbids, for example, the Coca-Cola
Company's passing off its product as Pepsi-Cola or reverse passing off Pepsi-Cola as its
product.”)
29
15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1), Lanham Act, sec. 43(a)(1), emphasis supplied.
30
See, e.g., Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, Chapter 1301.02(d)(titles of
radio and television programs are service marks).
31
In Williams v. UMG Recordings, supra note 16, the District court rejected plaintiff’s
claim that defendants’ failure to credit him as a co-author and co-producer of a motion
picture released on home video constituted a false designation of the origin of plaintiff’s
services as screenwriter and co-producer. The court stated that the subject matter at issue
was the “goods,” the home video copies, not of the services plaintiff allegedly
contributed to the creation of the work that defendants distributed in copies, see 281
F.Supp.2d at 1183-84. The hypothetical in text, however, addresses false designation of
origin of the content of a transmission, not of physical copies.
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that this does not make attribution a right under copyright; it makes
copyright law the leverage for a contract-based claim to attribution.) But,
as we will see when we turn to the discussion of copyright law, not all
creators are copyright owners: some never are, and others may transfer
their copyrights away without being able to require name credit or without
being able to bind downstream licensees to grant credit. Suppose, for
example, that an actor’s name is removed from film credits, and another
(fictitious) actor’s is put in his place. The actor is not a copyright owner,
but his filmed performance has effectively been repackaged under
another’s name. Does his claim survive? Or suppose I am a novelist;
regardless of what my publishing contract says about name credit, the
subsidiary rights agreement that my publisher enters into with a paperback
publisher does not call for crediting me as the author. If the paperback
comes out under another author’s name, I have no contract claim against
this third-party publisher. But the paperback “merely repackages” my
work as someone else’s. Do I have a claim against false designation of
origin? Do I have a claim if the publisher includes my work together with
another author’s, then gives credit for the entire work to the other
author? 32 In the latter case, the publisher may have done more than
“merely repackage;” does that disqualify any claim?
Whether or not the actor or I can still allege false designation of
origin, the Dastar Court’s reference to subsisting § 43(a)(1)(B) claims
against “false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact which . . . misrepresent[] the nature, characteristics
[or] qualities of his or her or another person’s goods or services . . .” may
in some instances preserve a Lanham Act right of action for authors and
performers. Arguably, removing my or the actor’s name and replacing it
with another’s constitutes a false or misleading representation of fact (who
is the author of this book; who performed in this film) which
misrepresents the nature, characteristics or qualities (authorship;
performance) of the goods (the work). Note that, for purposes of
§43(a)(1)(B), the Court appears to acknowledge that “goods” can mean a
“communicative work,” while, for purposes of §43(a)(1)(A), “goods”
would mean only the physical copies. Query whether it makes sense for
“goods” to mean two different things in these adjacent sections. In any
event the potential availability of a §43(a)(1)(B) claim becomes
particularly significant if, after Dastar, the “origin” of copyr ighted works
is falsely designated only when the entire work is misattributed, or worse,
only when physical copies are mislabeled as to their manufacture.

32

Cf. Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Co., 847 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1988)(only one of
several co-authors given authorship credit on sound recording). According to the
Williams v. UMG Recordings court, supra note 16, Dastar effectively overruled the
reverse passing off holding in Lamothe and similar Ninth Circuit decisions. See 281
F.Supp.2d at 1184 n. 10.
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Suppose, for example, that a famous novelist grants film rights in
his book. Apart from its title, the resulting movie bears only the slightest
resemblance to the underlying literary work. But, recognizing the market
value of the author’s name, the motion picture company promotes the film
(without the author’s permission) as “Stephen King’s ‘The Lawnmower
Man.’” 33 Or suppose that a copyright- licensed US broadcaster airs a
truncated version of “Monty Python’s Flying Circus,” presenting it as the
work of the British comedy troupe, even though the troupe did not
approve the broadcaster’s removal of approximately one-third of the
content. In both cases, the attribution to the creators is misleading, not to
say, vastly overstated. Presenting the work as “Stephen King’s” when
virtually the only thing in the film that is still the writer’s is the title, or as
“Monty Python’s” when the editing has garbled it, might falsely describe
the nature, characteristics or qualities of the work. The Dastar Court
indicated that a claim for false representation of the nature of the work
could lie if Dastar promoted its modestly altered videos as “quite
different” from the Fox originals when they in fact are quite the same;
conversely, a claim should remain available if a work is promoted as being
“by” an author, when its purveyor has in fact made it “quite different”
from the work the author created. 34
These examples offer variants of traditional “passing off” claims: a
version that the author claims is so altered that it no longer represents his
work is sold as if it were the real thing. Although the “goods” are a work
of authorship, this is analytically akin to passing off a fake Fendi bag as
though it were the genuine article. The same is true of the anonymous
16th century poet whom I sell as Shakespeare.
Would a “false
representation” claim also lie if I engage in “reverse passing off?”
Suppose that, rather than purchasing copies of the latest Brad Meltzer
legal thriller and affixing my name to them – conduct still actionable
under the Lanham Act after Dastar – I make new copies and sell them
under my name? Under Dastar, I am the “origin” of the copies (or
perhaps my publisher is), so a section 43(a)(1)(A) claim against me fails.
But I have also made a “false representation of fact which . . .
misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] qualities . . .” i.e., the
authorship, of my literary work (“goods”). If Brad Meltzer can make out
33

See King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
See M C CARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, §27.77.1 (2003) (“The Court hypothesized that if a
producer of a video that substantially coped Fox’s Crusade television series were, in
advertising or promotion, to give purchasers the impression that the video was ‘quite
different from that series’, then Fox might have a claim for false advertising for
misprepresenting the nature, characteristics or qualities or the creative content of the
product violation of §43(1)(B). That is, in this hypothetical, the defendant would be
making a false statement about the content of its communicative product.”). McCarthy
also notes that the false advertising prong contains a restriction that the “trademark
prong” does not: the misrepresentation must be “in commercial advertising or
promotion.” This is “not an insignificant limitation,” see discussion infra.
34
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the remaining elements of a claim for “misrepresentations of the nature,
qualities, characteristics . . .” then the effects of Dastar may not be as
devastating to creators as the Court’s concept of origin might initially
portend.
This analysis, however, may suggest too simple a sleight of hand:
next time, all an author – or, more significantly, 20th Century Fox – need
do is plead section 43(a)(1)(B) instead of 43(a)(1)(A). But this critique
overlooks the consumer protection focus of section 43(a). Section 43(a),
unlike section 32, does not require that the claimant be a trademark
registrant. This is because section 43(a) targets a wider range of deceitful
marketplace activity, including misleading trade dress imitation and false
advertising. The objective is not to create new rights for unregistered
merchants, but to protect the public. 35 This in turn suggests that the
application of section 43(a)(1)(B) to misrepresentations regarding the
“nature, etc.” of “communicative goods” should be limited to
misrepresentations material to the consumer. This standard may also help
us avoid the “Nile and all its tributaries” problem: in Dastar, Fox was not
the actual creator of the WWII film footage, nor is it clear what was Fox’s
role in the creation of the television series. In other words, from the
consumer’s point of view, accurate information about Fox’s or Dastar’s
relationship to the contents of the audiovisual work (as opposed to the
production of the physical copies) may not have mattered.
By contrast, knowing who is the actual creator generally is
material to the purchasing decision. 36 This observation may also be key
to resolving the potential tension in the post-Dastar treatment of
copyrighted and public domain works. The Dastar facts and policies
35

See M C CARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, §27.14 (“The courts have nearly unanimously held
that §43(a) provides a federal vehicle for assertion of infringement of even unregistered
marks and names. (citations omitted) As the Second Circuit remarked, §43(a) ‘is the only
provision in the Lanham Act that protects an unregistered mark’ and ‘Its purpose is to
prevent consumer confusion regarding a product’s source, . . .” citing, Centaur
Communications, Ltd. V. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987).
36
For example, Amazon.com’s website alone contains 6,420 usages of the phrase “from
the author of.”
See http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF8&oe=UTF-8&q=site:www%2Eamazon%2Ecom+%22from+the+author+of%22
(February 18, 2004). By contrast, in the case of movie ads, the “from the director/author
of” phrase often does not contain that director/author’s name, but only the name of the
previous popular work; one has to search further for the name of that director/author.
This suggests that the advertiser – usually the motion picture producer – perceives more
commercial value in the name of the previously successful motion picture than in the
name(s) of its creator(s). Current film THE LAST SAMURAI (Warner Brothers, 2003) is
advertised as “from the director of Legends of the Fall and Glory” (Edward Zwick)(see
http://lastsamurai.warnerbros.com/index.php?c=6 for posters, visited February 18, 2004);
the upcoming film THE DAY A FTER TOMORROW (Twentieth Century Fox, 2004) is being
promoted as “from the director of Independence Day” (Roland Emmerich) (trailer is
available at http://www.apple.com/trailers/fox/dayaftertomorrow, visited February 18,
2004).
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permit a distinction allowing 43(a) misattribution claims to persist for stillcopyrighted works, but the distinction is justified more as damage control
than on principle. As the example of anonymous 16th -century poet sold as
Shakespeare indicates, the public can be materially misled with regard to
the authorship of public domain works, too. Consider another instance of
copyright-permissible material deception: Copyright does not protect the
ideas, information or processes that a work discloses. As a result,
copyright protection for a work such as a cookbook is typically “thin,”
covering the chef’s literary flourishes, but not the culinary preparations
themselves. As a matter of copyright law, therefore, I am free to publish
my own cookbook appropriating the ingredients and following the steps
needed to produce Nigella Lawson’s or Emeril’s latest creations.
Moreover, because U.S. copyright law says nothing about how I label the
unprotected material that I copy, any express or implied fair use obligation
to credit one’s sources would not extend to mere copying of public domain
elements. Nonetheless, copyright’s free pass on copying should not also
mean that no law will prohibit me from representing that the gastronomy I
describe is of my own devising. Section 43(a)(1)(B), with its focus on
consumer protection, should supply that prohibition.
But, even if authorship is or can be a “characteristic” of the work,
the section 43(a)(1)(B) violation does not occur unless the
misrepresentation takes place in “commercial advertising or promotion.”
Simply mislabeling and selling the work without advertising the name
substitution may not constitute “promotion;” the statutory text suggests
that the mislabeler has called attention to the false information. One might
expect that there would be no market for an unpromoted work, so that, in
most instances the requisite “commercial advertising or promotion” will
occur. But the promotion might not always go to the alleged false
representation. For example, if the miscredited actor did not perform in a
featured role, his (or his false substitute’s) name might not appear on
posters and advertisements for the film. In those instances, it is not clear
that the spurned author or performer will have a claim. (It may also be
questionable whether the misrepresentation of a tertiary actor’s name is
material to consumer choice.)
There is an additional problem: even were the false representation
of the fact of authorship to occur in commercial advertising or promotion,
the author may not have standing under the Lanham Act to bring the claim.
(In fairness, the standing problem also pertained to claims of false
designation of origin, and may further illustrate the incomplete coverage
the Lanham Act afforded authors even before Dastar.) The problem is the
following: section 43(a) is generally perceived as creating a federal claim
against certain kinds of unfair competition; 37 in that case, some courts
have concluded, the parties to a 43(a) claim should be competitors. In
37

M CCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, §27.7 (history of §43(a)).
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those courts’ view, however, authors may not be “in competition” with
licensees or others who fail to respect their attribution claims. 38 Thus,
even if a false description claim survives, it is not clear an author can
bring it. 39
Ultimately, however, attempts to salvage authors’ claims against
misattribution under section 43(a) prove strained or insufficient. 40 More
importantly, restoring the pre-Dastar status quo at least for copyrighted
works will redress only false attributions, not non attributions, of
authorship. And because the Lanham Act, properly understood, is
consumer-oriented, rather than author-focused, the materiality test implicit
in this reading may exclude some authors’ claims.
We turn now to a law that is, at least in part, author-oriented, the
copyright law, only to find that, when it comes to credit, the current act
offers even fewer grains than can be gleaned from the trademarks field
after Dastar’s devastating passage.
II.

Copyright: The U.S. Law of Authors’ Rights Recognizes Few
Authors

In excluding communicative goods from the reach of false
designation of “origin” claims, the Dastar Court appears to have assumed
that the author who licenses rights in her work would always ensure that
she receive authorship credit. 41 So that even if the Copyright Act lacked
explicit provision for attribution rights, the author’s control over the
reproduction and other exploitation rights would de facto extend to
implementing an attribution right. The Court may also have thought it
unlikely as a practical matter that a licensee would refuse or neglect to
give the author name credit, particularly as the author’s name may serve as
a selling-point for the work. But these assumptions may have been
unfounded.
38

See, e.g., Halicki v. UA Communs., 812 F2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987).
See also Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1994) (creators of works made
for hire have contracted-away attribution rights).
40
For an even more aggressively apocalyptic reading, see David A. Gerber, Copyright
Reigns—Supreme: Notes on Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 93
Trademark Rep. 1029, 1032 (2003) (“although Dastar involved reverse passing off, its
sweep is much wider. The bright-line rule rejecting authorial claims under §43(a) should
lead to the death not only of the droit à la paternité or right of attribution, but other ‘moral
rights’ under §43(a) as well.”). Note, however, that Gerber is not a disinterested
commentator: he was Dastar’s counsel.
41
See Dastar, 123 S.Ct. at 2049 (“The creative talent of the sort that lay behind the
Campaigns videos is not left without protection. The original film footage used in the
Crusade television series could have been copyrighted . . . as was copyrighted (as a
compilation) the Crusade television series, even though it included material from the
public domain. . . . Had Fox renewed the copyright in the Crusade television series, it
would have had an easy claim of copyright infringement.”)
39
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First, under the Copyright Act, not every creator of a work of
authorship is a statutory “author” with power to license rights in the work.
Creators of “works made for hire” – employees and freelance contributors
to specified categories of works – have no copyright rights in the works
they write, perform, or otherwise execute. 42 The Copyright Act vests all
economic control in the employer or hiring party. As a result, under that
statute, the creator has no copyright rights to leverage into an attribution
right. 43 In some cases, collective bargaining agreements negotiate
attribution rights for certain classes of creators. 44 But, whether by choice,
or for lack of organization, many freelance creators are not unionized, and
these agreements do not assist non union creators. Moreover, even in
traditionally unionized sectors, creators may encounter resistance from
statutory copyright owners. For example, to an increasing extent,
screenwriters and other creative contributors to television programming
are facing demands from television producers to cut the “credits” that
follow the broadcast. 45
Second, even where the creator is the “author,” any attribution
right remains purely a creature of contract; if the contract does not specify
a right to credit, then no such right exists, since no statute lurks in the
background to afford a default right of attribution. Third, because the
right is purely contractual, it does not reach third parties, including
subsequent licensees.
But is the copyright situation really so dire? After all, when the
U.S. joined the Berne Convention, effective March 1989, we committed to
enforce its article 6bis moral rights, including the “right to claim
authorship,” at least with respect to foreign Berne Union authors. 46 In the

42

See 17 U.S.C. secs. 101 (definition of work for hire); 201(b) (employer for hire owns
all rights).
43
The creator may, however (at least in theory), bargain for attribution rights in the
employment contract, or as a condition of signing a commissioned work made for hire
agreement.
44
See, e.g., Article 8 of the “Basic Agreement” for Theatrical and Television (effective
May 2, 2001 through May 1, 2004) which provides that “The Company” shall give
credits for screen authorship “only pursuant to the terms of and in the manner prescribed
in the applicable [attached Schedule A].” Theatrical Schedule A contains thirty
paragraphs setting forth credit requirements; Television Schedule A contains thirty-one
such paragraphs.
45
See, e.g., “IDA [International Documentary Association] Responds to Elimination of
Credits,” at http://www.cinematography.com/index.asp?newsID=16 (Nov. 3, 2003)
(visited Nov. 26, 2003). Producers express concern that audiences lose attention during
the 30-second credit “crawl” and switch to other channels; it is not apparent that the two
or more minutes of commercials that typically follow the credit “crawl” have any greater
claim on the audiences’ loyalty, however.
46
The Berne Convention does not require that member States apply the conventional
minimum rights to their own authors, see art. 5.3.
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1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act,47 however, we declined to
implement article 6bis, on the ground that a patchwork of federal and state
claims formed a rough equivalent to the art. 6bis guarantees of the rights
of integrity and of attribution. 48 Were we fibbing? Some would say,
“Yes,”49 noting that the Berne Convention has no provision against scoff
laws, and that the US made sure that the TRIPS accord -- which
incorporates Berne but also supplies sanctions for noncompliance -excluded art. 6bis. 50 A less cynical view of Berne adherence would assert
that Congress in 1988 made the “rough equivalence” claim in good faith,
for it could not have anticipated that the Lanham Act might vanish from
the vaunted “patchwork.”51
As might be expected given the position taken on Berne adherence,
Congress has not subsequently established an explicit right of attribution
of general application. The enactment in 1990 of the Visual Artists Rights
Act, 52 did grant limited attribution rights, but only with respect to an
extremely narrow class of works. The class of “works of visual art”53 is
confined to the original or up to 200 signed and numbered copies of a
painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or a photographic image “produced for
exhibition purposes only,” so long as the work is not “made for hire.”
VARA affords artists whose works fall within its restrictive definition a
kind of private Landmarks law to preserve their works against mutilation
or destruction. Attribution rights, albeit included, are not the focus of the
Act. Indeed, VARA’s restriction to physical originals makes that statute a
very feeble measure for enforcing artist’s attribution rights: a “work of
visual arts” excludes mass market multiples, and VARA attribution (as
well as integrity) rights apply only to “works of visual art.” Thus there is
no VARA right to compel attribution for one’s artwork if the artist’s name
has been left off anything more than the original or a signed and numbered

47

Berne Convention Implementation Act, PL 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
See Report accompanying the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R.
REP . NO. 100-609, 100th Cong. 2d sess. at 37-39 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 100609]. See also Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, (SDNY 1978) (applying Lanham Act sec.
34(a) false designation of origin claim to truncated broadcast of Monty Python television
programs).
49
See, e.g., A. Dietz, The United States and Moral Rights: Idiosyncracy or
Approximation? Observations on a Problematical Relationship Underlying United Staes
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 142 RIDA 111 (Oct. 1989).
50
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organizations, Annex 1C, Results of
the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
51
In most of the other instances in which the U.S. clearly did not comply with Berne
norms, Congress did amend other provisions of the Copyright Act, for example, with
respect to the formalities of notice and registration.
See Berne Convention
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, §§ 7-9.
52
17 U.S.C. § 106A.
53
See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
48
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limited edition of 200. And, of course, VARA does nothing for literary,
musical, or most other authors.
Worse, under a truly pernicious reading of VARA, the Dastar
court appears to suggest that VARA’s enactment promotes a negative
inference that VARA is the only federal law locus for attribution rights: if
authors already enjoyed attribution rights, VARA would be superfluous,
and “[a] statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is
of course to be avoided.” 54
This is both perverse and wrong. It is
perverse because, given VARA’s very limited coverage, the result of this
reading is to leave most authors with fewer attribution rights post-VARA
than before. While statutes should to be read to avoid superfluity, they
should also be read to avoid impairing our treaty obligations. 55 A reading
that makes our Berne compliance even less plausible than before should
not have recommended itself to the Court.
Second, the Court’s suggestion is wrong because § 43(a) does not
make VARA superfluous. There may be narrow areas of overlap, but
VARA, in its severely constricted zone, affords a significant right that
§43(a) does not: an affirmative right to claim authorship, not merely a
right to object to misrepresentations of authorship that confuse consumers
as to the work’s origin. Moreover, VARA’s beneficiaries are artists, while
§ 43(a)’s are the consuming public, and, as discussed earlier, the rationales
for the laws are different. Courts addressing overlapping intellectual
property claims have acknowledged that differently motivated laws may
yield similar results when brought to bear on the same subject matter, yet
one does not drive out the other. 56
If VARA, at best, offers too little in the way of attribution rights,
the rest of the Copyright Act and of Title 17 are of no help, either. Or,
perhaps more accurately, nothing else in the Copyright Act explicitly
54

123 S.Ct. 2048.
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 114:
“Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United States.” See also
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (statutes should be
interpreted consistently with customary international law); see generally Ralph G.
Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction,
43
Vand. L. Rev. 1103 (1990).
56
See e.g. Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F.Supp. 1191, 1198 (SDNY
1979) (publisher of children’s books in the public domain may bring a trademark claim
against defendant’s copying of particular illustrations from the book; “because the nature
of the property right conferred by copyright is significantly different from that of
trademark, trademark protection should be able to co-exist, and possibly to overlap, with
copyright protection without posing preemption difficulties”). Cf. Bonito Boats v.
Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (federal design patent law preempts state laws
protecting against copying of boat hull designs but does not preempt state laws protecting
consumers against misleading presentation of products).
55
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recognizes attribution rights, and before 1998, nothing in that statute could
be construed to afford attribution rights. The much-derided Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, however, may contain the seeds of a general
attribution right; with sufficient ingenuity and effort, these seeds might be
made to germinate. The seeds may be found in the § 1202 provision on
“Copyright Management Information.” This provision was introduced as
part of legislation implementing the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty.
Section 1202 prohibits: (a) knowingly providing false copyright
management information, with the intent to facilitate or conceal
infringement. The provision also prohibits (b) knowingly or intentionally
altering or removing copyright management information, knowing (or
having reasonable grounds to know) that the alteration or removal will
facilitate or conceal infringement. Subsection (c) defines copyright
manage ment information. It includes: the name of the author; the name of
the copyright owner; and the “terms and conditions for use of the work.”57
Inclusion of the author’s name in protected copyright management
information suggests that the copyright law finally affords authors of all
works, not just “works of visual art” a right to recognition of their
authorial status. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the situation is a little
more complicated.
Section 1202 was designed to promote the dissemination of
copyrighted works by facilitating the grant or license of rights under
copyright (particularly through electronic contracting). Because accurate
and reliable information about the work is essential to its lawful
distribution (particularly online), § 1202 ident ifies that information and
protects it against falsification, removal or alteration. There are, however,
some respects in which § 1202 ensures the desired reliability and accuracy
only imperfectly. Moreover, the text does not fulfill all U.S. obligations
under article 12 of the WIPO treaty. Article 12 requires Contracting
Parties to prohibit, inter alia, unauthorized removal or alteration of
electronic rights management information, when the actor knows or has
reasonable grounds to know that the removal or alteration:
will induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of any right
covered by this Treaty or by the Berne Convention . . .
(emphasis supplied). The “right[s] covered by the Berne Convention” are
not only those found within Title 17. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention
declares authors' rights “to claim authorship of the work . . .” As
mentioned earlier, when the U.S. adhered to the Berne Convention,
Congress announced its position that it was not necessary to incorporate
the Article 6bis right of attribution into the body of the Copyright Act,
because other provisions of U.S. law, federal and state, adequately assured

57

17 U.S.C. § 1202(c).
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that right. 58 This means that misidentifying the author of a copyrighted
work might have violated some legal norms in the U.S., but it would not
have been copyright infringement. Thus, § 1202 falls short of the WIPO
treaty requirement, because § 1202 concerns only copyright management
information whose removal or alteration facilitates or conceals copyright
infringement.
Removal or alteration of copyright management
information identifying the author of the work would violate the WIPO
norm, but since it is not copyright infringement even willfully to miscredit
the author, there would be no violation of § 1202, unless it could be shown
that miscrediting authorship induces infringement. 59
There is another way in which § 1202 falls short of generalizing a
right of attribution to Berne levels. The DMCA does recognize the
importance of and public benefit to authorship credit, for § 1202(c)'s
definition of copyright management information includes “The name of,
and other identifying information about, the author of a work.” But §
1202 does not oblige the rights owner to attach copyright management
information to distributions of the work. At most, § 1202 instructs the
rights owner who does choose to attach copyright management
information, that the information should include the name of the author. 60
Even then, however, § 1202 does not dictate that a copyright owner who
chooses to include some of the information listed in § 1202 as Copyright
Management Information must therefore include all of it. As a result, §
1202 gives authors no guarantee that statutory protection of copyright
management information will cover their names.
To some extent, the Copyright Office may fill in the gaps in the
copyright management information scheme.
Section 1202(c)(8)’s
definition of copyright management information provides a residual
category of “Such other information as the Register of Copyrights may
prescribe by regulation . . .” For example, while the statute lists “the name
of, and other identifying information about, the author of a work,”61 the
statute does not reveal whether “author” in this context means the
statutory author/employer for hire, or the actual creator. Thus, it is not
clear whether the creator of a work made for hire also should receive
58

See supra, note,7.
Arguably, improper authorship credit could complicate or defeat title searching and
rights clearance, leading some users to infringe in frustration, but this seems rather
attenuated (particularly if other licensing information is not tampered with).
60
The definition of copyright management information appears to give the rights owner
the option of including some, but not all, of the listed elements, see § 1202(c) (“the term
‘copyright management information’ means any of the following information . . .”
emphasis supplied). But the definition also empowers the Copyright Office to
“prescribe” other information by regulation, see § 1202(c)(8); the Copyright Office thus
might make inclusion of the author’s name a mandatory ingredient of copyright
management information.
61
See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(2).
59
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authorship credit. 62 The Copyright Office could write Regulations
interpreting copyright management information to provide for authorship
credit to the contributors to a work made for hire as well as to creators
who are initial copyright holders. Consistent with the earlier discussion of
the optional character of the statutory list, however, it is unlikely that the
Copyright Office may by Regulation compel the inclusion of this
information.
III.

Putting the right to claim authorship into the U.S. Copyright Act
(where it belongs)

Ultimately, an amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act to provide an
explicit and general right of attribution of authorship may be necessary to
afford meaningful rights to authors, as well as to preserve Berne
compliance. Even before Dastar, U.S. law afforded only incomplete
coverage of authors’ attribution interests. 63 The absence of general
protection in the Copyright Act, and the doubt the Supreme Court has cast
on the continuing viability of authors’ Lanham Act claims could afford the
occasion to enact legislation specifically designed to recognize attribution
rights. This part of the article will imagine wha t such legislation should
say.
An initial question concerns the constitutional basis for a federal
attribution right. Does the copyright clause’s authorization to Congress to
secure the exclusive rights of authors in their writings include the power to
enact moral as well as economic rights? 64 The constitutional text hardly
compels the interpretation that the “exclusive Right” is exclusively
pecuniary. Although the first copyright statute and its successors provided
only for the economic rights to print, publish and vend, 65 that should not
prompt an originalist negative inference that the constitution restricts
Congress’ power to the rights (and subject matter) selected for coverage in
the first copyright statutes. Such an inference would exclude from
Congressional prerogative not only moral rights, but also the pecuniary
rights, such as translation and public performance rights, that Congress
later brought within the statutory grant. “Exclusive Right” implies
62

Cf. §1202(c)(5) (requiring that the information identify the screenwriter, performers,
and director of an audiovisual work; audiovisual works can be works made for hire under
§ 101).
63
See, e.g., Kwall, supra, note 7.
64
The question of its Constitutional authority to legislate moral rights appears not to have
troubled Congress at the time it enacted VARA. Congress simply assumed it had the
requisite power: the House Report confidently asserts that “Artists’ rights are consistent
with the purpose behind the copyright laws and the Constitutional provision they
implement: ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” See H.R. REP. No.
101-514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
65
Copyright Act of May 31 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 1 (granting authors of maps, charts and
books the “sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” such
maps, charts and books).
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authors’ control over their works; ensuring attribution is one element of
that control. In addition, exercise of that kind of control is fully consistent
with the constitutional goal of authorizing exclusive rights: to promote the
progress of knowledge. In the constitutional scheme, exclusive rights are
an impetus to authorship. Name recognition can furnish an important
incentive to create and disseminate works: fame may, after all, bring
fortune, and if fortune is not forthcoming, glory or notoriety may (at least
for a time) console those whom the market has yet to reward.
Any attribution rights statute must address the following issues:
1.
2.
3.

Who are the beneficiaries of the attribution right?
What acts violate the attribution right?
May the right be transferred or waived?

The first question is misleadingly simple: the right is one of
attribution of authorship; therefore authors are the right’s beneficiaries.
But who is an “author”? Are employed creators “authors” for this purpose,
even if in the U.S. they are not copyright holders? If many creators
contributed to the work, are they all entitled to credit? How significant
must a creative contribution be before attribution rights attach?
The second question may prove similarly elusive. There may be
situations in which omission of credit may be reasonable, but can a statute
realistically specify what those situations would be? On the other hand,
would an open-ended reasonableness exception end up swallowing the
rule?
As to the third question, statutory provision for waivers may better
alleviate the problems to which a reasonableness exception seeks to
respond, but a waiver option raises similar concerns regarding the
effectiveness of the right. On the one hand, in appropriate circumstances,
authors and licensees should be able to make private arrangements to blur,
blunt, or renounce rights to credit; ghostwriter agreements come to mind
in this context. But a general and generous allowance for waivers could
lead to boiler-plate contracts that gut any meaningful enjoyment of the
right regardless of context.
Other common law countries’ legislation might offer helpful
examples of implementation of the attribution right. We will look to the
U.K, New Zealand, Canada and Australia, because similarities in their and
our copyright and general legal cultures may make their laws more
persuasive points of departure than the Continental statutes which some
U.S. authorities tend to view with skepticism if not derision. 66 Moreover,
66

See Jon Baumgarten, Robert A. Gorman and Christopher Meyer, Preserving the
Genius of the System – A Critical Examination of Moral Rights into United States Law,
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the Commonwealth legislation, on the whole, is of recent vintage. With
the exception of Canada, whose bi-juridical tradition may account for its
earlier recognition of moral rights, these States did not explicitly
incorporate attribution rights into their copyright statutes until 1988 or
later. 67
After surveying these Commonwealth countries’ attribution rights,
we will address VARA’s treatment of infringement and of waivers. We
will consider whether these provisions, if applied to a broader range of
authors and of subject matter than VARA currently reaches, might, when
combined with the best features of the Commonwealth legislation,
produce a workable and effective attribution right for U.S. authors and
performers.
A.

Attribution Rights in Commonwealth Legislation

1. United Kingdom (and New Zealand)
The attribution right in the 1988 UK Copyright Designs and
Patents Act, as in its New Zealand echo, 68 is grudgingly given and easily
lost.
a.

Beneficiaries

The beneficiaries of the CDPA’s attribution right are authors of
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works. 69 But in the UK copyright
statute, “author” encompasses more than “the person [or persons] who
creates” a work.70 The Act further specifies who “that person shall be

Copyright Reporter vol. 8 no. 3, pp.1-20 (August 1990). See also Robert A. Gorman,
Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 421 (1990)
(comprehensive moral rights legislation is ill-advised because it conflicts sharply with
fundamental United States legal principles and would disrupt longstanding practices in
the entertainment and cultural industries.); Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art,
and the Suppression of Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral
Rights, 82 NW U.L. REV. 1011, 1112 (1988)(“enactment of statutes that embody a "moral
right of integrity" for auteurs is an unsound and lamentable step toward the suppression
of innovation, artistic and otherwise.”)
67
The UK adopted moral rights in the 1988 Copyright Designs and Patents Act. United
Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (c.48); The New Zealand Copyright
Act 1994 adopts much of the statutory language used in the CDPA 1988, including in its
provisions on moral rights; the provisions relevant to the attribution right are in Part 4 of
the Copyright Act, §§ 94-97; Australia’s moral rights amendments were enacted in 2000.
Australian Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000, No. 159,200. Canada
codified Berne Convention art. 6bis in 1931, but more recently amended the moral rights
provisions, in 1988. Canadian Copyright Act (R.S. 1985, c. C-42).
68
See supra, n. 67.
69
CDPA § 77.
70
CDPA, §9(1).
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taken to be”71 , and this depends on what kind of work is at issue. For
example, if the work is a sound recording or a film, the author is “the
person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the
recording or film are undertaken.”72 This in turn confers authorship status
on producers. However, the moral rights provision specifies that the
“director of a copyright film” has a right to be identified as the “director of
the work” and creates a distinction between authors and directors. 73
Creators of computer programs and employees who create works in the
course of employment do not enjoy attribution rights. 74 As in the U.S.,
copyright in a work originally vests in the author’s employer “where the
work is made by an employee in the course of his employment … subject
to any agreement to the contrary.”
b. Scope of the attribution right
The right entitles its beneficiaries to an identification that is “clear
and reasonably prominent.”75 The meaning of the right to be identified
varies according to the type of work and the circumstances. In most cases,
the right is “to be identified in a manner likely to bring his identity to the
attention of a person seeing or hearing the performance, exhibition,
showing, broadcast or cable programme in question.” 76
The
circumstances that trigger the right also vary according to the type of work.
For exa mple, in the case of a literary work, the right is triggered whenever
the work is “(a) published commercially, performed in public, broadcast or
included in a cable programme service; or (b) copies of a film or sound
recording including the work are issued to the public.” 77 Limitations
applicable to copyright also apply to the right of attribution, including fair
dealing; incidental inclusion in an artistic work, sound recording, film,
broadcast, or cable program; and the exclusion and limitation of artistic
copyright in industrial designs. 78 Several of the fair dealing exceptions,
however, require attribution of the copied source. 79

71

CDPA, §9(2).
CDPA, §9(2)(a).
73
CDPA §77(1).
74
CDPA § 79.
75
CDPA, §77(7).
76
CDPA, §77(7)(c).
77
CDPA, §77(2).
The Act also prohibits false attributions of authorship. See CDPA, § 84(5), (6); Lionel
Bently & William R. Cornish, United Kingdom, in M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL
EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (2003) 2-UK
§7(1)(b).
78
CDPA, §79(4).
79
CDPA, §30(1)-(3).
72
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However, to enjoy the attribution right, the author or other
designated beneficiary must “assert” it. 80 Assertion may be made by way
of a statement in an instrument assigning copyright, in another instrument
in writing signed by the author or director, or by requiring identification
on the “original or copy, or on a frame, mount or other thing to which it is
attached” of an artistic work, and binds only those who receive actual or
constructive notice of the assertion. 81 In addition, in an action for
infringement the court shall, “in considering remedies take into account
any delay in asserting the right.”82
The CDPA’s “assertio n” precondition derives from a peculiar, not
to say perverse, reading of article 6bis of the Berne Convention. The
Berne Convention declares that the “author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work.” From a provision entitling authors to recognition
of their status as creators, the drafters of the CDPA fashioned an
obligation to assert authorship before the right to be recognized can take
effect. Not only does the U.K. text torture the Berne text, but the assertion
requirement may well violate the Berne Convention’s rule that “the

80

CDPA, §77(1) (“the right is not infringed unless it has been asserted in accordance
with section 78.”)
81
The Act contains “elaborate provisions on the making of effective assertions and the
extent to which other persons are bound by them”. Lionel Bently & William R. Cornish,
United Kingdom, in M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (2003) 2-UK §7(1)(a). See CDPA, §78. (1) A person
does not infringe the right conferred by section 77 (right to be identified as author or
director) by doing any of the acts mentioned in that section unless the right has been
asserted in accordance with the following provisions so as to bind him in relation to that
act. (2) The right may be asserted generally, or in relation to any specified act or
description of acts— (a) on an assignment of copyright in the work, by including in the
instrument effecting the assignment a statement that the author or director asserts in
relation to that work his right to be identified, or (b) by instrument in writing signed by
the author or director. (3) The right may also be asserted in relation to the public
exhibition of an artistic work— (a) by securing that when the author or other first owner
of copyright parts with possession of the original, or of a copy made by him or under his
direction or control, the author is identified on the original or copy, or on a frame, mount
or other thing to which it is attached, or (b) by including in a licence by which the author
or other first owner of copyright authorises the making of copies of the work a statement
signed by or on behalf of the person granting the licence that the author asserts his right
to be identified in the event of the public exhibition of a copy made in pursuance of the
licence. (4) The persons bound by an assertion of the right under subsection (2) or (3)
are—(a) in the case of an assertion under subsection (2)(a), the assignee and anyone
claiming through him, whether or not he has notice of the assertion; (b) in the case of an
assertion under subsection (2)(b), anyone to whose notice the assertion is brought; (c) in
the case of an assertion under subsection (3)(a), anyone into whose hands that original or
copy comes, whether or not the identification is still present or visible;(d) in the case of
an assertion under subsection (3)(b), the licensee and anyone into whose hands a copy
made in pursuance of the licence comes, whether or not he has notice of the assertion.
(5) In an action for infringement of the right the court shall, in considering remedies, take
into account any delay in asserting the right.
82
CDPA, §78(5).
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enjoyment and exercise” of authors’ rights, including moral rights, “shall
not be subject to any formality.”83
Moreover, one may inquire how the assertion requirement affects
third parties. The text of the CDPA appears to leave significant gaps in
coverage. The text holds two classes of persons bound by an author’s
assertion of attribution rights: assignees and persons “claiming through”
them, when the assignment contained an assertion; and “anyone to whom
notice is brought of an instrument in writing [containing the assertion]
signed by the author or director.”84 The structure of the statute prompts
several questions. For example, what kind of written instrument is
contemplated, and how is notice brought to third parties? It appears that
identification of the author on the book, on the screen credits, etc., does
not, standing alone, satisfy the statute, because even though this form of
identification gives general notice of who the author is, it is not an
“instrument in writing signed” by the author. 85 If the publishing contract
contained the assertion, then the additional assertion printed in the book
would constitute the notice of the assertion in the publishing contract,
which in turn would be the signed written instrument. But what if there is
a printed assertion, but no contract, or no contract containing the assertion?
What if there is a contract, but no printed assertion? These and other
difficulties (notably, the anomalies respecting the Berne Convention)
counsel against adopting the British assertion requirement.
c. Transfer & Waiver of Right
The CDPA attribution right is not assignable, and passes on death
to the persons to whom copyright is passed or by testamentary
disposition. 86 But the Act also includes a broad waiver provision. Moral
rights may be waived by an instrument in writing, signed by the person
giving up the right. Unlike the Australian act which, as we will see,
requires considerable specificity for effective waiver of attribution rights
in non-employee works, in the U.K. a waiver of attribution rights may
relate to a specific work, but also more broadly to works of a specified
description, or more broadly still, to works in general. The waiver may
relate to existing or future works and it may be conditional or
unconditional or subject to revocation. 87 In addition, the same result may
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Berne Convention, art. 5.2.
CDPA, § 78.
85
Accord 493 Parl. Debates, H.L. (5th Ser.) p. 1302 (25 February 1988) (Lord Beaverbrook:
“the presence of a name on a book is not indication of a claim [of authorship, within the
meaning of the statute]”). See also 491 Parl. Debates, H.L. (5th Ser.) p. 362 (10 December
1987).
86
CDPA, §95(1).
87
CDPA, §87(1)-(3).
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be achieved by an informal waiver or any other transaction having effect
under the law of contract or estoppel. 88
2. Canada
Statutory recognition of attribution rights in Canada dates back to
the 1931 Copyright Act, whose text followed art. 6bis of the Berne
Convention, 89 though some earlier judicial decisions already “echoed the
philosophy of moral rights.”90 The current provisions on attribution rights
were, like the U.K. law, enacted in 1988. 91
a.

Beneficiaries

The 1988 Canadian text confers the moral right of attribution of
authorship on authors irrespective of copyright ownership. Although the
Act’s distinction between moral rights and copyright ownership suggests
that both employee and independent authors enjoy moral rights, the Act
does not define “author.” 92 The subject matter of coverage excludes
performances, sound recordings, and broadcasts because they are not
deemed “works,” and therefore are not considered to have “authors.”93
b. Scope of the attribution right
The author has the right to be known as the creator of her own
work, either by her own name or under a pseudonym. This right is limited
88

CDPA, §87(4).
Copyright Act of 1931 (Canada) § 12(7).
90
M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE (2003) 1-CAN §7 (Ysolde Gendreau and David Vaver). Citing, e.g.
Joubert v. Geracimo (1916) 26 Que. K.B. 97, 35 D.L.R. 683 (stigmatizing failure to
credit dramatist as author and changing title of work as “intolerable frauds,” suggesting
that punitive damages could be awarded, and stating: “[A]n author is entitled to have his
work credited and his text respected, and also to have the material benefit that may flow
from the reputation of his name or the popularity or his works.”).
91
Dissatisfaction with the old provisions (under which actions asserting moral rights
generally failed) led to the enactment of new provisions in 1988. See, eg. David Va ver,
“Author’s Moral Rights in Canada,” 14 I.I.C. 329, 354 et seq. (1983). The one exception
was a case in which an artist had Christmas wreaths removed from the necks of geese he
had sculpted for a department store. Snow v. The Eaton Centre (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d)
105 (Ont. H.C.).
92
However, one case in which the issue of authorship was raised held that the subject of a
photograph could not claim moral rights infringement since he was not the author of the
photograph. Ethier v. Boutique a coiffer Tonic Inc. J.E. 99-298 (Que. S.C.).
93
M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE (2003) 1-CAN §7(1).
Performers rights, as enumerated in Part II of the Copyright Act, do not explicitly include
the right of attribution, but the exception for fair dealing in the case of criticism or review
or news reporting only applies of the source and the name of the author, performer,
maker or broadcaster are mentioned. Section 29.1, 29.2.
89
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by two conditions. First, it may be asserted only in connection with an act
subject to economic rights under copyright, that is, when reproduction,
publication or performance occurs. 94 Second, the right may be given
effect only to the extent that its exercise is “reasonable” in the
circumstances or usages. By contrast, the right to remain anonymous is
not subject to any criterion of reasonableness. 95 However, when the
author is an employee or a ghost-writer, the appropriateness of the
author’s claim to name credit is to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
and is linked to the possibility of waiving moral rights. 96
The case law suggests that courts use the reasonableness standard
and the waiver provision (which allows for implied waiver) to dismiss
claims of infringement of the right of attribution. 97 Even where an act
cannot be claimed as reasonable (such as a clear case of plagiarism or
omission of an author’s name), the court may dismiss the case if the
plaintiff cannot show any loss from the breach. 98
c. Transfers and waiver
Attribution rights subsist for the same term as copyright in the
work at issue, and they pass with the copyright if bequeathed, or as other
property passes in the absence of a will. 99 Attribution rights may not be
assigned but may be waived in whole or in part. 100 Waivers or consents to
particular acts need not be in writing and may be either express or implied.
However, “assignment of copyright in a work does not by that act alone
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CA, §14.1(1). But cf. Desputeaux v. Editions Chouette (1978) inc. [2001] R.J.Q. 945,
16 C.P.R. (4th ) 77 (Que. C.A.) (leave for appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada granted
on November 8, 2001) (precluding arbitration from determining the authorship of a work
because that would implicate moral rights), reversed, Supreme Court (2003 SCC 17)].
95
CA, § 14.1(1). “The author of a work has…, in connection with an act mentioned in
section 3, the right, where reasonable in the circumstances, to be associated with the work
as its author by name or under a pseudonym and the right to remain anonymous.”
96
M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE (2003) 1-CAN § 7(1)(b).
Citing Tat-ha v. Centre hospitalier de
l’Universite Laval, (1999) A.Q. no. 181 (Que. S.C.) (hospital employee who had
prepared a report that was modified before publication under the name of other people
was unsuccessful in her attempt to claim co-authorship because the practice was deemed
reasonable and the circumstances probably amounted to an implied waiver of her rights.).
97
M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE (2003) 1-CAN §7(1)(b).
98
See Boudreau v. Lin (1997) 75 C.P.R. (3d) 1, 14 (Ont.) (student’s claim that he had lost
employment opportunities through his professor’s failure to name him as the author of a
paper was dismissed as speculative); Desmarais v. Editions Fides J.E. 99-1424 (Que. Ct.)
(action by a photographer’s estate was dismissed after a publisher, who had omitted to
mention the photographer’s name to identify him as the author of the cover photograph,
included such a mention in the second printing of the book.).
99
CA, §14.2(1)-(2).
100
CA, § 14.1(2).
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constitute a waiver of any moral rights.”101 On the other hand, once a
waiver is established in favor of the copyright owner or licensee, it runs in
favor of persons authorized by them unless the language of the waiver
otherwise indicates. 102
3. Australia
Australia enacted moral rights amendments to its copyright law in
2000, following more than 10 years’ study and discussion. 103 Of the
countries examined here, Australia’s law appears to be both the most
highly elaborated and the most balanced in its approach to the interests of
creators and exploiters.
a. Beneficiaries
Under the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act of 2000, the
“author of a work has a right of attribution of authorship in respect of the
work.”104 The author of a work may be identified “by any reasonable
form of identification” so long as the identification is “clear and
reasonably prominent.”105 If the author has made known, generally or to
the person required to identify the author, that the author wishes to be
identified in a particular way that is “reasonable in the circumstances,” the
identification is to be made in that way. 106 The Act does not define author,
although it adopts the general presumption that the person named as the
author on publicly distributed copies is the work’s author. 107 The Act does
limit the “author” designation to individuals (thus excluding corporations
and other juridical persons). 108
The Berne Convention also presumes that the author is the person
who the divulged copies say is the author, 109 but the overall context there,
101

CA, § 14.1(3).
CA, § 14.1.(4).
103
See Discussion Paper, Proposed Moral Rights Legislation for Copyright Creators,
Commonwealth
of
Australia
(1994)
available
at
http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/au/other/media.OLD/1077.html; Copyright Law Review
Committee, Report on Moral Rights, AGPS (January 1988) available at
http://www.law.gov.au/www/rwpattach.nsf/viewasattachmentPersonal/E12E15ED9F963
E4CCA256B4100092DA9/$file/Moral%20Rights%20Table.pdf.
104
CA, § 193(1). BRAD SHERMAN AND JAMES LAHORE , M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND PAUL
EDWARD GELLER, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (2003) 1-AUS
§7(1)(a). [Other Aus. Treatises: e.g., Ricketson & Richardson?]
105
CA, §195(1); §195AA. “Reasonably prominent identification” is defined in §195AB.
106
CA, §195(2).
107
CA, §127(1). This is subject to section 35, which sets forth circumstances under
which an employer will be considered the author of an employees work. Special rules
also apply for ascertaining authorship of a photograph, see CA, §127(3).
108
CA §190.
109
Berne Conv. Art. 15(1).
102
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as elsewhere in the Australian copyright act, is economic rights. In the
context of attribution rights, the presumption does nothing for the author
who complains that her name did not appear on the copies of the work.
An approach like the U.K. statute’s, defining the “author” as the “creator”
of the work, 110 appears more helpful, although this may merely defer the
inquiry to the undefined term “creator.”111
The Act distinguishes beneficiaries of the attribution right from
owners of economic rights. Employees may not be copyright owners, 112
but they are vested with moral rights (although, as we shall see, the ir
rights are easily relinquished). Even where, under Australian law, the
subject matter is not classed a “work,” as is the case with a
“cinematograph film,” the Act confers the attribution right on “the maker
of the film,” defined as “the director, the producer of the film and the
screenwriter of the film.”113
b.

Scope of the attribution right

The right of attribution applies to “attributable acts.” The definition
of these acts depends on the type of work at issue. 114 The author of a
literary, dramatic, or musical work may invoke the right of attribution
where the work is reproduced in material form, published, performed in
public, transmitted, or adapted. 115 The author of an artistic work has the
right to be identified as the author where the work is reproduced in
material form, published, exhibited to the public, or transmitted. 116 The
designated creators of a film have the right to be named where the film is
copied, exhibited in public, or transmitted. 117
110

UK 1988 CDPA art. 9(1).
See generally, Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative
Copyright Law, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1063, 1069-71 (2003).
112
See CA § 35(6) (employer is owner of copyright in work created by employee
pursuant to employment).
113
CA, §189.
114
CA, §193(2). “The author’s right is the right to be identified in accordance with this
Division as the author of the work if any of the acts (the attributable acts) mentioned in
section 194 are done in respect of the work.”
115
CA, §194(1).
116
CA, §194(2).
117
CA, §194(3).
The Act also expanded the duty to the author of a work to refrain from certain
acts of misattributing authorship of that work. The right precludes inserting or affixing
another person’s name in or on the work or film, or in or on a reproduction of the work or
film, in such a way as to imply falsely that another person is its author. CA, §195AD(a),
195AE(a). In relation to “artistic” works specifically, the right also precludes authorizing
the use of a person’s name in connection with the work or with a reproduction of the
work. CA, §195AE(2). This right generally precludes the dissemination of the work or
film, or any reproduction of the work or film, to the public in a way that implies falsely
that another person is the author, if the offender “knows that the person is not the author
of the work.” The acts that constitute dissemination in violation of this right vary
111

29

The right of attribution is subject to the limitations of
reasonableness, necessity, and other conditions indicated by the 2000
statute. For example, the right is not infringed if it was “reasonable in all
the circumstances not to identify the author.” 118 The factors the Act
enumerates to consider in determining reasonable non attribution of
authorship for literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works 119 differ slightly
from those for film works. 120 In all cases, however, the factors take
account of industry practice, and give courts considerable discretion in
their assessment of reasonableness.
c. Transfer & Waiver of Right
The duration of the attribution right is coterminous with the other
rights under copyright (life plus 50). 121 While an author’s moral rights can
be exercised post-mortem by her legal personal representative, the rights
are not transferable by assignment or by will. 122 Where there is more than
one author of a film or a work as included in a film, the Act gives effect to
any co-authorship agreement requiring that the rights be exercised

according to the type of work or film at issue. CA, §195AD(b)-(d) deals with literary,
dramatic or musical works; CA §195AE(2)(b)-(d) deals with artistic works; CA
§195AF(2)(b)-(c) deals with films.
For literary, dramatic, or musical works and for films the Act specifies a duty to
refrain from knowingly performing the work in public as another author’s. The right als o
applies to adaptations or alterations of literary, dramatic, or musical works or films, and
precludes disseminating to the public, by any of the specified modes, any substantially
altered form of the work or film if the offender knows that it has been changed. This
right does not apply to artistic works. CA, §195AG, 195AH.
118
CA § 195AR(1).
119
See CA § 195AR(2)(a)-(i). (a) the nature of the work; (b) the purpose for which the
work is used; (c) the manner in which the work is used; (d) the context in which the work
is used; (e) any practice, in the industry in which the work is used, that is relevant to the
work or the use of the work; (f) any practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in
the industry in which the work is used, that is relevant to the work or the use of the work;
(g) any difficulty or expense that would have been incurred as a result of identifying the
author; (h) whether the work was made: (i) in the course of the author’s employment; or
(ii) under a contract for the performance by the author of services for another person; (i)
if the work has 2 or more authors—their views about the failure to identify them.
120
See CA, 195AR(3)(a)-(i). (a) the nature of the film;(b) whether the primary purpose
for which the film was made was for exhibition at cinemas, for broadcasting by television
or for some other purpose; (c) the purpose for which the film is used; (d) the manner in
which the film is used; (e) the context in which the film is used; (f) any practice, in the
industry in which the film is used, that is relevant to the film or use of the film; (g) any
practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in which the film is
used, that is relevant to the film or the use of the film; (h) any difficulty or expense that
would have been incurred as a result of identifying the maker; (i) whether the film was
made in the course of the employment of the director, producer or screenwriter.
121
CA, §§ 33, 195AM(1).
122
CA, §195AN(1)-(3).
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jointly. 123 With respect to all other works, the Act also gives effect to coauthorship agreements bearing on the attribution right. 124
Waiver of moral rights is permissible under the Act, and consent of
the author—or a person representing the author—is a defense to any
infringement action. The act or omission must be “within the scope of a
written consent genuinely given by the author.” Consent to be effective
must be given “in relation to specified acts or omissions” and in relation to
a specified work or works. 125 The requirement of specific consent is,
however, dramatically relaxed in the case of employee creations: “Consent
may be given by an employee for the benefit of his or her employer in
relation to all acts or omissions…and in relation to all works made or to be
made by the employee in the course of his or her employment.”126 For all
works, whether or not employee-created, a properly-executed consent is
presumed to extend to all licensees and successors in title. 127

4. The Worst and Best of the Commonwealth Acts
The previous discussion has already underscored some of the
weaknesses of the Commonwealth Acts, most glaringly the UK’s
“assertion” requirement. The UK and Canadian provisions on waiver
would similarly seem to offer authors little effective protection, as
boilerplate renunciations, even with respect to future works, are
enforceable, and need not even be in writing. Waiver provisions of some
kind are probably consistent with article 6bis of the Berne Convention.
While that treaty specifies the independence of moral rights from
economic rights, and further emphasizes that moral rights persist “even
after the transfer of the said [economic] rights,” article 6bis does not
clearly prohibit the waiver of moral rights. 128 On the other hand, the
independence and persistence of moral and economic rights under Berne
also implies that a grant of economic rights does not of itself entail a
waiver of moral rights. Rather, respect for the independence of moral
rights suggests that any waiver, to be effective, must be stated with
sufficient specificity to distinguish the moral rights waiver from
affirmative transfers of economic interests. I believe the UK and
Canadian provisions do not meet this standard. By contrast, the Australian
act offers a better model because it gives exploiters the opportunity to
123

CA, §195AN(4).
CA, §195AN(5).
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126
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127
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contract out of attribution rights in writing in specific contexts, but (apart
from employee works) bars the blunderbuss approach.
With respect to infringement, the countries surveyed also link
violation of the attribution right to violation of an economic right under
copyright; this means that acts of reproduction, public performance, etc.
which are excused as “fair dealing” or are otherwise non infringing do not
trigger the attribution right. On the other hand, in certain instances, the
“fair dealing” criteria set out in the Australian, UK, and Canadian Acts
already require that the copied source be credited. In other instances,
however, particularly regarding audiovisual works and sound recordings, a
work may be copied for permissible purposes, but the author may not
ensure that her name will appear on those copies. 129
The UK and Canada provide an open-ended undefined
reasonableness criterion for enforcement of attribution rights. The burden
appears to be on the author to demonstrate that her demand for name
credit is reasonable. A reasonableness requirement may have the merit of
flexibility, but the concomitant drawback of unpredictability; given
authors’ generally weaker position, the latter feature may prove
particularly disadvantageous. By contrast, the Australian Act better
reconciles the interests of authors and exploiters in two ways. First, it
places the burden on the exploiter to show that the omission of credit was
reasonable. Second, the Act articulates factors cabining “reasonableness.”
These not only introduce flexibility, but may also enhance predictability.
This is not a paradox; rather, the Act provides an important incentive for
interested parties (or their representatives) to anticipate and work through
situations in which credit should or should not be required. This is
because the Act includes as a reasonableness factor “any practice
contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in which the
work is used, that is relevant to the work or the use of the work.”130
B. The U.S. Visual Artists’ Rights Act
While VARA’s coverage is too limited to supply a meaningful
source of attribution rights for most authors, the way in which the act
129

See e.g. Aus. CA 1968 § 42 (requiring “sufficient acknowledgment” for use of
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for “reporting of news in a newspaper,
magazine or similar periodical” but not for “reporting of news by means of a
communication or in a cinematograph film.”); UK CDPA § 30(3) (“No acknowledgement
is required in connection with the reporting of current events by means of a sound
recording, film, broadcast or cable programme.”); Cf. Can. CA § 29.1-2 (Requiring for
the purposes of criticism or review and news reporting that “(a) the source; and (b) if
given in the source, the name of the (i) author, in the case of a work, (ii) performer, in the
case of a performer's performance, (iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or (iv)
broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal” be mentioned).
130
CA § 195AR(2)(f).
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implements the stingy rights it does grant is worth examination. VARA
entitles authors “to claim authorship of [their] work[s].” 131 It does not
require “assertion” or other formality to make the right enforceable.
Under VARA, attribution (and integrity) rights are not transferable,
but they are waivable. 132 Happily, VARA does not allow co-contractants
to shake off authors’ rights restraints by means of a blanket, boiler-plate
waiver. Rather, VARA protects artists by permitting waiver only if the
author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed by
the author. That instrument must specifically identify the work, and the
uses of that work, to which the waiver applies, and the waiver may apply
only to the work and uses so identified. 133 This language makes clear that
an “all my right, title and interest” sort of waiver would be void. The law
thus denotes sensitivity to the specificity of moral rights, while
introducing a degree of flexibility toward art object owners and/or
copyright exploiters permissible under Berne. Arguably, the best
recognition of moral rights would countenance no waivers. This position,
however, is probably too extreme for the U.S., and Berne does not require
it. As a practical matter, moreover, despite their formal prohibition, de
facto waivers are likely to occur. The artist may be better protected under
a regime requiring specificity of waivers than under one where an
ideologically pure no-waiver law is in fact rarely observed.
Moreover, under VARA, the burden of securing a waiver falls on
the party other than the artist. If the art object’s owner, or the grantee of
the copyright in the artwork, fails to obtain a writing from the artist
executing the waiver, then the artist retains all moral rights. It is up to the
other party to secure the artist’s written agreement to change the initial
allocation of moral rights. Absent this legislation, most of an artist’s
moral rights protections could be obtained, at the artist’s initiative, only by
contract. Because many artists may be poor negotiators, or may cond uct
their business rather informally, requiring artists to “contract into” moral
rights often as a practical matter would deny them the exercise of moral
rights. Instead, the very informality of art work commissions may work to
artists’ advantage, for a handshake deal or a vague writing will not effect
the waiver. The law’s reversal of the initial position may therefore entail
considerable favorable consequences for artists. 134
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17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A). VARA also entitles authors to prevent use of their names
on works they did not create, as well as to prevent use of their names on “a distortion,
mutilation or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation.” Id. § 106A(1)(B) and (2).
132
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
133
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
134
However, the law also provides that one joint author's waiver of moral rights binds all
joint authors. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
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At the time of VARA’s enactment, Congress anticipated that the
requirement of specific waivers might in the long run simply enhance
lawyers’ and word processors’ employment opportunities, for lawyers
could be expected to devise language sufficiently comprehensive and
detailed to fend off every conceivable exercise of moral rights. This
would defeat the purpose of compelling artists and art owners to reflect on
and negotiate over the genuine need to forego moral rights. As a result,
Congress set an additional safeguard by instructing the United States
Copyright Office to conduct a study of the practice developed under the
law's waiver clause. 135 The study, published in 1996, however, uncovered
too little data regarding actual waiver practice to permit meaningful
assessment of the frequency, content, and impact of waivers of attribution
and integrity rights under VARA. 136

C.

Outline of a Proposed Statute

Our review of the implementation provisions of the
Commonwealth Acts and of VARA suggests the following outline for an
attribution rights amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act.
1.

Beneficiaries

The right’s beneficiaries should be the human (not juridical)
authors and performers, regardless of their employment status. Unlike
VARA, an attribution rights amendment should not exclude from its ambit
creators of works made for hire. Nor should the law disqualify categories
of works: all works of authorship, and all musical, dramatic,
choreographic or audiovisual performances should be covered. Similarly,
the number of a work’s authors or performers should not of itself
disqualify these participants from the right to claim authorship. 137 While a
135

Visual Artists Rights Act, H.R. REP. No. 101- 514, at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6932.
136
See Final Report of the Register of Copyrights, Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Art
Works
123
(Mar.
1,
1996)
executive
summary
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/exs um.html (10/24/96).
137
Not all participants in an extensively staffed work such as a motion picture are authors,
even though, by contractual arrangement mechanics, hairdressers, etc. may receive name
credit. See Randy Kennedy, “Who Was That Food Stylist? Film Credits Roll On”, New
York Times, January 11, 2004. I would limit this proposal to authors and performers.
Caselaw on joint authorship may afford guidance as to what kinds of contributions make
someone an “author.” See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000);
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d
Cir. 1991). See also, F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship
of Motion Pictures Under the US Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 225 (2001); Roberta
Kwall, Author-Stories: Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint
Author Doctrine, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of
Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 1063 (2003).
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multiplicity of authors or performers might prompt fears that enforcement
of an attribution right will be too unwieldy, the implementation problems
are better addressed through an infringement standard that incorporates a
reasonableness criterion, as well as through carefully devised waiver
provisions.
2.

Scope of the attribution right

The duration of the attribution right would be the same as the
copyright term. Arguably, the public interest in accurate identification of
a work’s creators persists beyond the expiration of exclusive economic
rights in the work. Indeed, as the earlier discussion of Lanham Act
misattribution claims regarding public domain works indicates, I doubt
that a healthy public domain demands freedom not only to copy, but also
freedom to deny or to falsify authorship credit. Nonetheless, different
durational consequences flow from the distinct nature of authors’ rights on
the one hand, and consumer protection on the other. The interests
underlying these regimes may at times converge, hence authors’ preDastar resort to the Lanham Act, faute de mieux. But neither fully
captures the other. By placing the attribution right in the copyright act, I
am contending that it is an exclusive right like the other rights comprising
a copyright, enforceable (for limited times) without proof of economic
harm or consumer confusion. 138 The unfair competition-based Lanham
Act claim does not confer a property right in gross; it allows injured
economic actors (who may not in fact be authors) to act as proxies for the
confused consumer, to correct the false information the defendant has
injected into the marketplace. To each regime its own: to authors, control
over the use of their names in connection with their works for so long as
economic rights last; to consumers, protection against false representations
of fact in commercial advertising or promotion for so long as those
misrepresentations are materially misleading. Respect for the copyr ight
public domain counsels against conflating the two regimes, lest the
attribution right be leveraged into control akin to that sought by 20th
Century Fox in Dastar.
The attribution right would be infringed when an author’s or
performer’s name is omitted from publicly distributed copies and
phonorecords, 139 or from public performances, including transmissions, of
the work. 140 While the statute should distinguish between public and
138

Arguably, the incentive rationale for copyright would urge that the right of attribution
be perpetual, as the prospect of immortality for her name might prompt some to create.
But this would conflict with “limited Times,” and is likely to prove unadministrable in
practice.
139
A “phonorecord” is the material object in which a sound recording is fixed, see 17
U.S.C. § 101.
140
Works incorporating substantial preexisting copyrighted material, such as derivative
works, should also credit the authors of the adapted or substantially excerpted work. The
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private distributions or communications, with only the public ones
triggering the right, fair use and other statutory exceptions should not
supply a defense. It is important to recognize the difference between
permissible copying or communications on the one hand, and uncredited
copying or communications on the other. 141 This does not mean that
omission of name credit can never be fair and reasonable. Rather, the test
of reasonableness in this context is not the same as for fair use. The
question is not whether the use should be prevented or paid for, as it is
when fair use is at issue, but whether the use, even if free, should
acknowledge the user’s sources. The manner and medium of the work’s
dissemination may well affect the reasonableness of nondisclosure of
authors’ or performers’ names. For example, a requirement to identify all
authors and performers may unreasonably encumber the radio broadcast of
a song, but distributed recordings of the song might more conveniently
include the listing. This may be particularly true of digital media, where a
mouse-click can provide information even more extensive than available
on a printed page.
As for the details of a reasonableness standard, I believe a U.S.
statute might profitably emulate the Australian act, both in its technique,
placing on the exploiter the burden of showing reasonableness, and in its
articulation of reasonableness factors, including its encouragement to
parties to devise voluntary codes for various sectors of creative activities.
obligation to give credit would be subject to a reasonableness standard, see discussion
infra.
An amendment to the Copyright Act to establish attribution rights would also require a
transitional provision concerning the right’s effective date. I would propose that a work
first publicly communicated or distributed on or after the amendment’s effective date be
covered by the attribution right, regardless of when the work was created. With respect
to public communications or distributions occurring before the amendment’s effective
date, the amendment should preserve such state or federal attribution rights as may then
have existed. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(preserving state attribution and integrity claims in
works created or sold prior to VARA’s effective date). See also, Australia, Copyright Act §
195AZM (providing that 2000 Moral Rights amendments are prospective only) (In relation
to literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works, other than those included in a film, the
right of attribution applies to works that were made before or after December 21, 2000.
However, the right only applies to acts carried out after December 21, 2000. §
195AZM(2). In relation to films and literary, dramatic, musical and works included in
films, the right of attribution only applies to films made after December 21, 2000. §
195AZM(1).)
141
For example the “fair dealing” exception in the Australian and UK copyright statutes
requires “sufficient acknowledgement” of the authors of certain works. See Aus. CA §§
41, 42 44, 45; UK CDPA § 30(1)(2).
§107 of the US Copyright Act, the fair use exception, provides that it applies to § 106A
VARA rights as well as to the economic rights in § 106, even though any application of
fair use is likely to be limited. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 22 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6932 (“given the limited number of works covered by the Act,
and given that the modification of a single copy or limited edition of a work of visual art
has different implications for the fair use doctrine than does an act involving a work
reproduced in potentially unlimited copies.”).
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In fact, the credit agreements negotiated between industry groups such as
the several motion picture and television guilds and the studios 142 might
inspire similar codes elsewhere.
In light of the uncertain status of creators’ Lanham Act false
attribution claims post-Dastar, the attribution rights amendment to the
Copyright Act should also prohibit false attributions of authorship. These
claims are analytically distinct from traditional moral rights, which protect
the author’s right to claim authorship of her works: these instead assert a
right to disclaim authorship of a work not by the author. Nonetheless, if
the Lanham Act cannot redress these claims, for example, because of the
“commercial advertising or promotion” prerequisite, or because of
authors’ lack of standing, then the Copyright Act should provide a remedy.
The proposed amendment would in this respect follow the UK, New
Zealand and Australia, whose moral rights amendments grant authors
rights against both non attribution and false attribution. 143
3.

Waiver

Both VARA and, to some extent, the Australian amendments
provide an appropriately narrow approach to waivers of attribution rights.
To be enforceable, the waiver should be in writing and signed by the
author or performer, before the work is created or performed, 144 and
should specifically identify the works and the kinds of uses to which the
waiver applies. As in Australia, the waiver might, unless otherwise
specified, pass on to the co-contractant’s successors. On the other hand,
ambiguities in the scope of the waiver should be construed against the
party asserting the waiver (whether or not that party is the original
grantee). Unlike the Australian Act, a U.S. attribution rights statute
should not allow blanket waivers for present and future works of
employees. Employee-executed waivers should meet the same standard as
those of authors who are vested with copyright. Because attribution rights
are independent of economic rights,145 an author should not need to be
vested with the economic rights in order to qualify as a holder of
attribution rights. With respect to works of multiple authorship, my
proposal departs from VARA, which allows one joint author to waive all
142

See e.g, the collective bargaining agreements of the Writers Guild of America (East
and West), Directors’ Guild, Screen Actors Guild, AFTRA, AFM.
143
See UK CDPA, § 84(5), (6) , Aus. CA, §195AD-H, see discussion of Australian false
attribution claim, supra n. 115.
144
Formalization of the waiver before creation or performance may be necessary to avoid
extortion by transferees who demand the waiver in return for payment for work done.
See Schiller & Schmidt v. Nordisco, 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring that writing
that makes a commissioned work “for hire” be executed before creation of the work).
145

See, e.g., Berne Conv. Art 6bis. 17 U.S.C. sec 106A(b) (authors of works of visual art
have attribution and integrity rights “whether or not the author is the copyright owner.”).
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co-authors’ rights. 146 I would provide that a waiver is effective only as to
the co-author(s) who sign the requisitely specific writing; co-authors who
do not sign would retain their attribution rights. 147
4.

Remedies

Injunctive and monetary relief should be available to redress
violations of the attribution right. While a remedy compelling inclusion of
the author’s name in subsequent public distributions or communications of
the work may be the principal form of relief, modification of existing,
undistributed inventory may also be appropriate. 148 Authors should be
able to claim damages based on a showing of specific harm. Alternatively,
because such a showing may be difficult to demonstrate, 149 an attribution
rights amendment ought to provide for statutory damages. As is already
the case for VARA violations, registration should not be a prerequisite to
obtaining statutory damages. 150
Conclusion
146

See 17 U.S.C. sec. 106A(e)(1).
The Copyright Office Study, supra, makes a similar recommendation. Final Report of
the Register of Copyrights, Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Art Works at xvii (Mar. 1,
1996) (“A point of relative consensus voiced in the Office’s public proceedings and in
academic sources such as Nimmer on Copyright was that VARA inappropriately permits
one joint author to waive the moral rights of coauthors in a joint work….Congress may
wish to amend the statute to provide that no joint author may waive another’s statutory
moral rights without the written consent of each joint author whose rights would be
affected.”). See also Roberta Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post-VARA, 1 Marq. Int. Prop.
L. Rev. 1, 45 n. 246 (1997) (“allowing one joint author to waive the rights under VARA
for all other joint authors significantly undermines the rationale for moral rights
protection.”); See M ELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8D.06[D].
There may be instances in which the public would retain an interest in knowing who is a
work’s true author even if that person willingly (and specifically) waived her attribution
right. This is another reason to maintain the distinction between copyright–based and
Lanham Act-based (mis)attribution claims.
148
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 404(2) (addition of notice to copies distributed to the public after
omission of notice discovered). See e.g. Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780
F.2d 189 (1985).
149
See Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir.1998) (Architect Johnson sued another
architect Jones who had copied Johnson’s plans but put his own name on them. Court of
Appeals held Johnson entitled to recover Jones’ gross revenue from the reverse passing
off, and that Johnson’s actual damages were wholly speculative, and thus not
recoverable.) See also Waits v. Frito Lay, 978 F. 2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)(evidence
supported damage award in claim for voice misappropriation under California law of
$200,000 for injury to peace, happiness, and feelings of performer whose unique singing
voice was imitated in a radio commercial). For damage awards under VARA, see Martin
v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (1999) (Defendant city demolished a work of art by
plaintiff artist, who sued under VARA. Court of Appeals upheld trial court’s award of
$20,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount allowed for non-willful VARA
violation).
150
See 17 U.S.C. § 412, referencing § 106(A)(a).
147
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The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to secure for limited
times the exclusive right of authors to their writings. 151 Curiously, those
rights, as enacted in our copyright laws, have not included the right to be
recognized as the author of one’s writings. Yet, the interest in being
identified with one’s work is fundamental, whatever one’s conception of
the philosophical or policy basis for copyright. That is, whether one sees
copyright as a personality right conferring on the author the ownership of
the fruits of her labor, or as an economic incentive scheme to promote the
production of works of authorship, or as a public works program designed
to fill the public domain, (or, most accurately, as a combination of the
three), giving credit where it is due is fully compatible with both the
author-regarding and the public-regarding aspects of these goals. But,
after Dastar, the state of U.S. authors’ and performers’ entitlement to
obtain name credit for their contributions, doubtful before, has been
rendered the more precario us. While once authors could seek the partial
cover of a “patchwork” of protections, 152 of which the Lanham Act
furnished the strongest cloth, currently they are left in doctrinal tatters.
With even the figleaf of Berne Convention compliance now substantia lly
stripped away (to wear out the sartorial metaphor), it is time to do the right
thing, and amend the copyright act to provide explicitly for attribution
rights. This article proposes the framework and content of such a statute.
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See U.S. CONST ., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
See Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. A RTS, 555 (1986); H.R. Rep. No. 100-609,
at x (1988).
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